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Introduction
In Japan, there have been times when people who serve their community or nation are
enshrined and venerated as spirits. In the case of Yasuko Nakaya, she did not want her husband
to be remembered in this way because they were both Christians. However, a group of officials
in the Self Defense Force (SDF) helped a veteran’s association get her husband enshrined at a
gokoku 護国 (nation-protecting) shrine. Nakaya took them to court and was awarded damages
because the court ruled that the enshrinement violated the constitutional division between the
state and religion. However, the SDF continued to appeal the case and it came before the
Supreme Court where they decided that the SDF was not at fault as they were not directly
involved and their motivations were not based in religion. Rather, the court argued that they
intended to improve morale and were helping an organization act out social custom rather than a
religious rite. This gets at a very important question. How do religion and the state relate to each
other in Japan today? There are some scholars who argue that the concept “civil religion”
encompasses the relationship between religion and the state in modern Japan. Civil religion itself
is something that is hard to define and difficult to discuss in the Japanese context due to the
history of the term religion.
Religion and Civil Religion
The definition of religion has a very long history that is bound up in the Enlightenment
and the modern European obsession with categorizing everything. Talal Asad speaks directly to
religion as an anthropological category in Genealogies of Religion where he argues that religion,
as defined and discussed in the past, does not work as a proper category because it fits one
society at one time as he explains in the context of the shift from the defining characteristics of
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Christianity from the Middle Ages to the 17th century. 1 Since there is a shift in the
understanding of religion in the same place and in the same religious tradition, it would only
follow that there would be more of a change in the understanding of similar phenomena in
another country with a completely different religious tradition. Jason Josephson describes how it
was difficult for “religion” to be translated in Edo Japan when the Americans came because a
single term that encompassed both belief and practice that also included all traditions did not
exist in Japanese at the time. 2 This idea is echoed in Junichi Isomae’s article where he discusses
how religion had various terms that were used for translation in the early years of Japan’s
introduction to religion such as shūshi 宗旨, meaning sect laws, but that term had the
connotation of practice and did not encompass the idea of belief like religion did. 3 The word
eventually chosen for religion in Japan was shūkyō 宗教, which came to mean something more
internal, based on faith rather than external practice. 4 From these articles it is clear that religion
is not a very old concept in relation to the existence of religious traditions in Japan.
Civil religion itself is a phrase that Jean-Jacques Rousseau coined to describe the need for
a religion of the state that could guide the morality of the people. Rousseau describes civil
religion as something that has a god who is intelligent and mighty, upholds the sanctity of law,
and rewards the just while punishing the wicked. Civil religion, according to Rousseau, is
something that the government uses to unite the people across all religions unless the state itself
is the arbiter of the religion, in which case others are expelled from the state on the basis of not
being a part of the religion. 5 Emile Durkheim presented another idea for civil religion which is
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that religion itself is something that society creates to perpetuate itself and have an ideal toward
which to work. People practice the rites and rituals to affirm their unity as a society. 6
Williams and Demerath argue that Rousseau’s idea of civil religion is created by the
government and instituted upon the people, while Durkheim’s idea of civil religion is a creation
of the people that naturally occurs in society. 7 However, even though Rousseau and Durkheim
both have forms of civil religion derived from their theories, it was not until Robert Bellah
examined civil religion in the context of the United States that it became something popular to
discuss among scholars. Bellah argues that a civil religion borrows from the greater religious
background found in the area and is used to create a system that borrows from both the secular
and religious institutions. Explaining this union further, civil religion is a structure that is made
by taking bits of both the ancien régime and the modern democratic institution to successfully fit
government actions in religious language without singling out one religion as superior,
invalidating the idea of separation between the state and religious authority. 8 Bellah’s definition
fits more along the line of Rousseau’s definition of civil religion, which makes that definition a
starting a point for the discussion of civil religion.
There are many different opinions on civil religion from various different scholars.
Ronald Beiner argues that civil religion is not the successful merger of politics and religion and
is instead a “necessary contradiction” as a religion that is good for politics is tyrannical and a
religion that works more for the people does not work well for politics. 9 His point is that the
ideal civil religion is not something that can exist in society since there has been a division of the
state and religion; there is not a proper way to recreate the union of the state and religion. This
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point goes against the Bellah’s point of fitting the government into religious language. Bruce
Murray discusses civil religion in the United States, and argues that it is the sacred weaving of
the people together as a nation though patriotism and nationhood. 10 In his definition of civil
religion, he draws closer to the Durkheimian idea of civil religion as something that comes up
from the people, which in his definition is the patriotism and nationhood which is held as sacred
by the people through different traditions. However, Murray does further mention arguments on
the topic of civil religion in the courts. This discussion ranges from the idea of non-sectarian
prayer at public school graduations in the case of Lee v. Weisman in which civil religion was
mentioned as existing, but not being allowed to sponsor prayer due to the Establishment clause
of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court also decided that the words “under God” were
permissible in the Pledge of Allegiance because it fell under the banner of “ceremonial deism.” 11
Civil religion is a term that means different things, including religious language and meaning
welded to the state actions, such as the Pledge of Allegiance. It is clearly a category whose
meaning is up for debate even within the Western world, but it can become more complex when
applied to places outside of the West. In the case of Japan, there are many differences in how
civil religion presents itself.
Something else that is important when discussing religion in Japan is the lack of religious
adherence claimed by the Japanese people. A survey conducted in 2005 by the Japanese General
Social Survey found that 60% of the people in Japan do not follow a specific religion and of
those who do, over 50% did not have a strong devotion to any religion. 12 Religion is something
that is difficult to measure in Japan because of how the term “religion” was forced on the country
when it first had contact with the United States. As such, there are high levels of people who
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claim not to be religious in Japan at all, and religious activity is something that is ascribed to the
Japanese people. Further, civil religion is an etic category that the scholars have attempt to apply
to postwar Japan to describe what they see as the celebration of the Japanese identity or
government support of religious insitutions.
Civil Religion in Postwar Japan
Scholars have various positions on civil religion in postwar Japan. There are some who
argue that civil religion along the lines of State Shinto is on the rise while others argue that the
civil religion found among the people is more about celebrating being Japanese through local
festivals. There are those who would also argue that there is a celebration of being Japanese in a
theory known as Nihonjinron 日本人論, or Japanese Theory. There is also the belief that civil
religion is not something that exists in Japan at all. I argue that civil religion is not a term that
should be applied to postwar Japan because it gives a sense of unity that does not exist when
looking at those things argued to be civil religion.
Some scholars, such as K. Peter Takayama, take a more Rousseauean route in examining
civil religion. Takayama in his 1988 article argues that since the abolition of State Shinto in the
postwar era, there has been a loss of Japanese national identity that was not fulfilled in the forms
of democracy and progressivism.13 Takayama explains that during the early postwar era,
Japanese people mostly felt that the old ways of the prewar era could sustain them, but that idea
changed with the growing affluence of the 1980s under the rule of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP). 14 He argues that the LDP has been trying to recreate the civil religion of the past by
attempting to rewrite the textbooks and nationalize the Yasukuni Shrine. Specifically, he uses a
quote by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone who argues that they Yasukuni Shrine is equivalent
13
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to Arlington Cemetery and that in order for it to fulfill its true function properly, the shrine must
be transferred from Shinto control to government control. 15 Takayama argues that a new civil
religion is on the rise in Japan due to the growth of the new nationalism and seems to come from
a perspective that it is a foregone conclusion. I believe that civil religion is not a foregone
conclusion; rather, I think that there is too much disunity in the discussion of how Yasukuni
should be governed for scholars to argue that civil religion is on the rise in Japan.
Ian Reader argues that civil religion still exists in Japan. However, his idea of civil
religion is different than the idea that Takayama believes is taking hold. Rather than the
Roussaeuean government leading the revitalization of State Shinto, creating a civil religion from
the top down, he believes in a more Durkheimian civil religion that exists among the people
centering on the idea of the furusato 古郷, or “one’s native village.” In this model, the people
create civil religion based on the rituals surrounding the village shrines and matsuri 祭り,
festivals. 16 Reader argues that the community festivals and their related activities are merely part
of being Japanese and not necessarily religious. 17 While I do agree that civil religion can be
created from the people celebrating their identity, I do not necessarily agree with Reader that the
practices of the Japanese in their festivals connect to a civil religion because religion in Japan is
not easily defined. I believe that what Reader is observing is just religious action in Japan rather
than civil religion raised up from the people.
Winston Davis takes yet another approach to the idea of civil religion in postwar Japan,
namely that civil religion from the prewar era, State Shinto, has been secularized to form the
theory of Japanese identity, or Nihonjinron. Davis argues that although it is fragmented,
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Nihonjinron has overtaken the old idea of State Shinto to become the new basis of Japanese
identity, and that with time it may even become a Japanese civil religion. 18 Davis’s argument
hinges on the idea of secular and religious being two separate things and the idea that State
Shinto has in fact gone through a secularization process, despite the very idea of civil religion
being something that muddies the line between what is secular and what is religious. Even more
problematic is that Davis takes these ideas out of their contexts when using them in relation to
Japan and that is why I do not find his notion of a secularized civil religion very compelling.
Harumi Befu argues along the lines of Davis that Nihonjinron fits the idea of being the
Japanese civil religion. However, he believes this because there is no other identity-based theory
that is more highly supported by the Japanese people. He brings up percentages of people polled
who accept Nihonjinron as a proper way to measure Japanese identity and nearly all of those
polls showed less than 50 percent support or belief in Nihonjinron. 19 I disagree with Befu by
simply promoting support for civil religion in Japan because it is still something that is
contentious among the Japanese people. Concerning Nihonjinron, there were equal amounts of
people who agreed with the idea that it was a good fit for Japanese identity and those who were
not sure if it fit. The lack of a clear unity on the subject means that civil religion should not be
used to describe this as it is not wholly supported by the people.
Michiaki Okuyama’s views on civil religion in postwar Japan differ considerably from
these positions. Rather than arguing whether a specific idea fits the phenomena in postwar Japan,
Okuyama argues that it is good to think about the phenomena in Japan and then compare it to a
phenomenon that exists elsewhere to better contextualize what both mean. 20 I do not agree with
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the assertion that the debate about a specific concept should be dismissed in Japan because if
scholars are going to discuss the concept, then there needs to be a named concept to discuss.
I believe that civil religion is not a proper etic application to postwar Japan because there
is too much division about the arguments presented by scholars for it to fit properly. Regarding
the relationship between the government and religious institutions, there seems to be a less welldefined answer than either it is State Shinto in a new form or that civil religion is nonexistent.
The courts do not completely agree on the way religion and the state are allowed to interact and
even more importantly, the people do not completely agree about the relationship between the
two. There are significant voices on both sides of the issue that try to prove their point, and
because of the lack of sufficient agreement, I would argue that civil religion is too definite a term
to fit the discussion that goes on about the nature of the relationship between the state and
religion.
Case Studies and Methodology
I will start this evaluation of civil religion in postwar Japan by discussing the
applicability of “civil religion” in the courts, focusing more on Rousseau’s idea of civil religion.
There are various important court cases that set up the precedent for the separation of religion
and the state in Japan, focusing more on the government’s ability to go through with different
actions that support religious institutions. The 1976 Nakaya Enshrinement case dealt with how
the SDF helped an organization enshrine a widow’s husband against her wishes, upon which the
Supreme Court and the lower courts did not completely agree. There is also the 1989 Ehime
Donation case which dealt with the local government using public funds to donate trees to a local
shrine, which was defended as merely being a cultural practice and not religious. The
disagreements between the lower and upper courts speak more to how the relationship between
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the government and religion is disagreed upon between the courts. Further, the Supreme Court
broke the precedent of defending the government in cases involving the support of religious
institutions when it came to the 1997 Yasukuni Shrine visitation case, where the court said that it
was not constitutional for the prime minister to visit the shrine in an official capacity.
The Yasukuni Shrine is a very important symbol in the discourse on civil religion in
Japan today. It enshrines the souls of those who died in service to the defense of Japan and
included in this group are 14 class-A war criminals. There is a debate surrounding the Yasukuni
Shrine and how proper it is for prime ministers to visit the shrine and make public worship at the
shrine. There are also other issues that affect the nature of government visits to Yasukuni, like
the fear of nationalism and its effects on relationships with South Korea and China. The
separation of the state and religion issue that comes with the Yasukuni Shrine is not wholly
partisan, both members of the conservative LDP and the more liberal Democratic Party of Japan,
DPJ, are a part of the group called “let’s go to Yasukuni Shrine to pay homage together” (minna
de Yasukuni ni sanpai suru kaigi みんなで靖国に参拝する会議). 21 With the division among
the members of the Diet and the issues surrounding Yasukuni in general there is no consensus on
whether prime minister visits are allowed or whether that would constitute breaking article 20 of
the Japanese constitution forbidding support of a particular religion.
In the past two case studies, I plan to focus on Rousseau’s definition of civil religion. In
this one, I will focus more on Durkheim’s definition of civil religion, focusing on the people
celebrating their own identity. Matsuri are a way that people from the community come together
and celebrate their identity in such a way. The matsuri are festivals and they can occur on many
different levels depending on which festival it is. There are some which are purely local and are
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not well known outside of the village or town and there are others which are very well known
such as the Gion matsuri. This case study points to the question as to what exactly religion is in
Japan. As discussed previously, Japan had the idea of religion imposed on it when America came
to the country and forced it to open, trying to secure the freedom to worship in Japan. Belief was
not something that was central to the idea of worship in the Japanese case before the arrival of
the West and it can still be that way today. It is important to understand how religion works in
Japan when examining this type of civil religion because religion can be based more on practice
than belief. Matsuri are religious festivals and the community celebrating them does not
necessarily make them civil religion. The debate about whether the practice of religion among
the people is civil religion seems to be unimportant in the light about how religion is understood
to be more praxis based in Japan.
Civil religion is something that was defined outside of the context of Japan and scholars
debate whether it exists in the postwar era. The majority opinion seems to be that civil religion
exists in the postwar era, but I would argue that it is far more discussed and debated among the
Japanese for one opinion to simply be for it to exist or not to exist. I argue that civil religion, a
category not used by the Japanese people, does not exist in postwar Japan. There is too much
debate and discussion for it to properly be used as a label for postwar Japan.

10

Section 1: The Courts
Shinto is the religion which has been the most linked with government power in the
modern and contemporary eras. This has created a number of different court cases which deal
with the separation of the state and religion, focusing almost entirely on the relationship that
different levels of government have with the Shinto religion. But in order to properly analyze the
relationship between the postwar government and the Shinto religion it is important to examine
what Shinto is and if it qualifies to be a religion at all. From there it is possible to look at the
different cases that attempt to clarify the relationship between the government and religion.
These court cases can serve as a litmus test for how the government sees the separation between
the state and religion. There is disagreement not only between the different court levels and the
judges who serve on the courts, but also among the people of Japan in how close the government
and religious authority should be. The closer they are, the more reminiscent of State Shinto it is.
The Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony case, the Minoo Memorial case, the Nakaya
Enshrinement case, and the 1997 Ehime Shrine Donation case are all cases that address the
separation of the state and religion. In examining the court cases and the reactions of those
people who participated in them, it is clear that the disagreement about government-sponsored
rituals and donations is significant enough that something akin to the idea of Rousseauean civil
religion does not exist in postwar Japan.
Rousseauean civil religion is the idea of reconciling the state and religion into one thing
in which both are supported. Hammond describes that civil religion is something that must exist
as separate of both the government and religion, something that is guided by both, but something
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independent. 22 The disagreements and arguments that exist in postwar Japan deal with the very
nature of how the government and religion get overly entangled. The Rousseauean idea of civil
religion cannot work because the government and religion do not work in tandem with each
other. This same problem does not exist in the United States, because the United States was
founded with the idea of “religion” and the idea of the separation of the state and religion. With
this foundation, something like civil religion could be created in order to legitimize the
government while still allowing for the government to have no mandated religion. Japan had no
concept of religion, the traditions were just teachings that people followed. The religion that was
constructed in order to unite the Japanese people is Shinto and is important to the discussion of
civil religion.
Shinto is considered by many to be the indigenous religious tradition of Japan, something
akin to “animism” which reveres nature. However, a problem comes up in trying to define Shinto
as religion and even further in trying to define it as something separate from the other religious
traditions in Japan such as Buddhism. As discussed previously, religion is an import to Japan
from the Western world via the Americans who came in 1853 demanding religious freedom for
American citizens who would visit Japan. The definition of religion is especially important when
looking at the construction of Shinto in the modern era. Tracing the idea of Shinto in Japan, it
originally started out as a way to describe the three teachings (Confucianism, Daoism, and
Buddhism) that were imported from China, and the growth of Shinto as something more closely
associated to what it means today started in the fifteenth century. 23 There was a separation of
Shinto from Buddhism in Japan which helped to construct it as Shinto, which could have been
considered something less of a unified tradition and more something akin to local festivals and
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local gods that was tied very closely to Buddhism. Part of the separation was the reemphasis of
the emperor as the descendent of the sun goddess Amaterasu and his importance as the leader of
Japan in the cult of the emperor. 24 The cult of the emperor is deeply important to the institution
of State Shinto. In Japan today, Shinto is something that can be described in various ways,
As the aforementioned Kawagita explains, “Shinto is recognized as the collective
daily customs innate to the Japanese people which is perceived as a thought, a
precept and a religion and it is also perceived as the ideology of the
ultranationalists (State Shinto).” This “collective daily customs innate to the
Japanese people” could be called civil religion. Shrines exist all across Japan and
have become the object of worship for many citizens, and furthermore, they have
deep roots in our daily lives. In other words, it is civil religion (or possibly public
religion). 25
Essentially, Shinto is something that is more than religion; it is something that is thought to
encompass every Japanese person’s experience. Nitta also considers this definition to be
representative of civil religion, as it explains that is something intrinsic to every Japanese person.
However, there are people in Japan who do not uphold Shinto as something sacred that they need
to follow and actively reject it as a way of practice for their lives. Broad claims aside, the
definition that Nitta provides is a good way to understand that Shinto can be seen as more than
just religion in the Japanese context.
This more expansive definition of Shinto can explain how Shinto was constructed in the
postwar era under American Occupation. During the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa eras, from
around 1868 until 1945, Shinto was not taken as a religion at all, but rather a political and civil
way that people worked in society. State Shinto is often the term that comes to mind when
discussing Japan during the war. State Shinto can be misconstrued as a state religion, but as
Jason Josephson argues: “Japanese policy makers often described it as ‘national ceremonies’
(kokka no soshi) ‘national teachings’ (kokkyo), ‘political teachings’ (chikyo), or patriotic ‘duty’
24
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whose realities they contrasted to a religion they characterized in terms of belief (shinkyō).” 26
Shinto, during this period from the Meiji to end of World War II, was in a privileged position in
which it was something beyond just a religion. State Shinto was a category of civic teaching tied
to the government. During American Occupation, there was something known as the Shinto
Directive according to which State Shinto was supposed to be removed through the freedom of
religious establishment and the separation of the state and religion. 27 Thus, something which had
been a part of the government for so long was suddenly removed by adopting a strict separation
of the state and religion after World War II by the American Occupation. This means that
something as simple as a groundbreaking ceremony as standard practice before all construction
is made more difficult because the government and religion are not supposed to mix.
The first major case that dealt with the authority that the government has when regarding
religion is the Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony case. In this case, before building a school
gymnasium the city government sponsored a Shinto ceremony, jichinsai 地鎮祭, which is a way
within Shinto to ensure a safe construction project. The case was brought to the local courts by a
member of the Communist party who had to attend the event as a city leader. 28 The Supreme
Court sided with the government and in its argument stated that while the act of sponsoring the
ceremony did in fact have religious significance it was not comparable to an act which might
support Shinto or oppress other religions. 29 This is an important point as it serves as the standard
by which all other cases are judged by when dealing with the separation of the state and religion.
The action that the government is sponsoring must not oppress other religions and also must not
promote the religion. Otherwise, government sponsorship of religious events is legal, since it is
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impossible for the government and religion to not interact. The district court, where the suit was
originally brought, decided that the Shinto Shrine did not need to return the money since the
ceremony had a secular purpose. 30 The Nagoya High court disagreed and decided that the money
needed to be returned after the original court decision was appealed by the plaintiff, Sekiguchi,
and held that there had to be a strict separation between the government and religion or the
freedom of religion cannot be guaranteed. 31 The Supreme Court had agreed with the district
court but disagreed with the Nagoya court and so the Supreme Court created the standard stated
above in order to give a guiding principle that could be used in other such situations where the
separation of the state and religion became unclear.
The Minoo Memorial case deals with how honoring the war dead and veterans play into
the separation of the state and religion. The case dealt with two residents of the city, Satoshi and
Reiko Kamisaka, who argued that the relocation of a war shrine, chūkonhi 忠魂碑, was an
entanglement of the state and religion in a way that violated the constitution. They specifically
targeted this case because they lived during the war and they did not want their children in the
elementary school near where the memorial would be placed to have to be under the imposing
sight of the memorial. They aimed to take the city to court in order to resolve it on a public
stage. 32 The reasoning behind the entanglement argument was because all souls who are
enshrined in the chūkonhi were also enshrined in Yasukuni and the government had agreed to
pay for the relocation and lease of public land to the Japanese Association of War Bereaved
Families (JAWBF) for the memorial which was a kilometer away, in front of an elementary
school. 33 The Osaka district court agreed that moving the stone was too much of an entanglement
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with religion and ordered that the money be returned, which caused a stir among Mayor Nakai
and different groups, one the most notable of which was JAWBF. 34 It is easy to see here that
Mayor Nakai, the defendant, had a great deal of support as there was widespread criticism of the
court decision; however, there was also support for the plaintiffs in the case, the Kamisakas.
When it was time to go through with the next trials, they had to hire lawyers because Mr.
Kamisaka was no longer in good enough health to argue on his own behalf. Much of the money
that was raised came from people all over Japan to support the plaintiffs in their endeavors. 35
The support for both sides of the case shows the divisiveness surrounding the separation of the
state and religion. Observing the divisiveness between people on the subject of the separation of
the government and religion allows one to see how something like civil religion, which depends
on the agreement of the people about which actions violate the separation of the state and
religion, cannot exist in postwar Japan.
When the Osaka High court handed down its decision on the Minoo Memorial case, the
judges reversed the decision of the district court. Where in the district court the inscription of the
characters chū, kon, and hi on the chūkonhi memorial made it an object of religious veneration
that was inextricably tied to the Yasukuni shrine, the high court simply ruled that the memorial
was not an object of religious veneration. 36 The disagreement in the decisions of the courts is
different in this case than in the Tsu case because in the latter the Supreme Court looked at the
event and created the “purpose-effect standard” to judge government and religious entanglement,
whereby if there is significant promotion or oppression of a religion as seen through the eyes of
the “average” citizen, then the two would be overly entangled. In the Minoo Memorial case, the
Osaka High court sidestepped the argument of the religious nature of the shrine by simply not
34
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acknowledging the shrine as a place of religious meaning. The Minoo Memorial case is based on
people’s attitudes to the memorial structure. In the case of the courts, the decision was split
between the two and the appeal sent to the Supreme Court was rejected because they reasoned
that the “average” citizen of Japan would not see the memorial as something religious. 37 There
are more ways to look at the shrines, such as the enshrinement of people in war memorials.
The Nakaya Enshrinement case is the case that was used at the beginning of this thesis. A
woman, Yasuko Nakaya, was contacted by her prefecture’s gokoku shrine, to inform her that her
husband had been enshrined there and that there would be annual rituals to honor him as a kami
神 for protecting the country. Mrs. Nakaya fought against this and sued the Self Defense Force
(SDF) and SDF Friendship Association for enshrining her husband because this violated he
religious freedom as a Christian which her husband had respected in life. 38 The case itself dealt
with the freedom to practice religion and the line that keeps the government and religion separate
from each other. Mrs. Nakaya won the first two cases, in the local court and in the district court,
with both holding that she was owed money from the SDF Friendship Association and the SDF
itself since it had been discovered that the SDF had been involved in the enshrinement of Mrs.
Nakaya’s husband. However, the enshrinement of her husband was not reversed because the
gokoku shrine and members of the SDF Friendship Association could also claim religious
freedom and Mrs. Nakaya herself was not forced to go worship at the shrine. 39 The issue that
was most pressing for the case itself seems to have been the implication that the government, in
this case the SDF, had in fact been in conversation with the SDF Friendship Association
concerning the enshrinement of Mrs. Nakaya’s husband. If there was not any evidence of a link
between the two, then the courts would have likely ruled that Mrs. Nakaya was not forced to do
37
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anything regarding her husband’s enshrinement and removing him from the shrine would violate
the religious rights of the Yamaguchi gokoku shrine priests and members of the SDF Friendship
Association.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it was ruled that the SDF and the SDF
Friendship Association did not collaborate in a way that showed government support for Shinto
in the enshrinement of Mrs. Nakaya’s husband. Moreover, since she was not required to
participate in any events regarding his enshrinement, her own religious beliefs were not hindered
in any way. 40 However, even though this was the majority opinion, there was significant
disagreement among the judges about what the SDF had done. One judge had a dissenting
opinion, but there were also those in the majority who were critical of the SDF’s actions in the
case, ranging from believing that the SDF should have exercised more self-control on the
enshrinement to the belief that the SDF was fully complicit in the enshrinement and breaking the
separation the state and religion, but not actually infringing on Mrs. Nakaya’s freedom of
religion. 41 The division of opinions between the judges on the Supreme Court demonstrates the
disunity on the opinion of what the government is allowed to do concerning religion. Beyond just
the judges on the Supreme Court, the local and district courts and the Supreme Court disagreed
on what the government is allowed to do in regards to religion. The decision here officially sides
with the government agreeing that there was no significant violation of Mrs. Nakaya’s freedom
of religious belief and that the SDF was not heavily involved in the enshrinement of Mrs.
Nakaya’s husband. However, in looking at the different judges’ own opinions on the matter,
there is much greater critical diversity in how the SDF handled itself in the situation and how it,
as a government agency, should act in regards to such religious matters.
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In 1997, there was a large break with tradition in regards to how the Supreme Court dealt
with the entanglement of religion and the state. The decision that broke this tradition was the
Ehime Tamagushi case in which a governor in Ehime prefecture was donating tamagushi 玉串,
offerings of tree branches, to local Shinto shrines and the Yasukuni shrine. In the past this had
been allowed as a social custom, but it was struck down. 42 The Supreme Court decision striking
this down was incredibly important since it broke the precedent of the Tsu standard by looking at
how the “average” citizen would view the donations and judge if the action was too much of an
entanglement between the state and religion. In this case, the Supreme Court argued that there
needed to be a higher amount of scrutiny applied when looking at the involvement of the state in
religious affairs. 43
Tracing the case itself, it started in the district court to determine whether or not the
governor was allowed to use city money for donations to different Shinto shrines, including
Yasukuni shrine. A Buddhist priest took the governor to court and argued that he was privileging
Shinto above other religions and violating the constitutional separation of the state and religion.
The district court agreed with this reasoning and ordered the money to be paid back to the city.
The case was appealed and went to the high court where it was decided that the governor was
simply acting within the confines of social customs and did not significantly privilege one
religion as defined by the Tsu case. In a case like this, the Supreme Court would normally side
with the government in their decision. However, the Supreme Court deemed that the donations
were illegal, not because the government needs to be completely uninvolved with religion, but
rather because the government should remain neutral, at the very least giving offerings to other
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established institutions, such as Buddhist temples. 44 The important part of the ruling is that the
Supreme Court decided that privileging one religion over another makes the government
religiously biased, which could affect official visits to the Yasukuni shrine.
The courts have never agreed really on the idea of the separation of the state and religion.
The district courts tend to be more critical of state involvement in religious affairs and rule that
practices such as the Minoo memorial relocation were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
tends to side with the government, arguing that government officials were merely following
social customs. There is also contention about the subject among the people of Japan, as seen in
the numbers of people who support both sides of these arguments in the different cases. Further,
the American Occupation force made Shinto into a religion in order to keep the nationalism of
State Shinto under the wartime government. Practices which had been considered secular were
suddenly considered religious, making the separation of the state and religion more difficult
when concerning former government practices. Because of these disagreements about the
separation of the state and religion, and the 1997 ruling from the Supreme Court, civil religion
does not exist in postwar Japan. There is not enough agreement for government sponsored rituals
and donations to function as something that guides the nation by the means of principle, such as
in the definition provided by Rousseau.
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Section 2 – Yasukuni Shrine
Scholars such as K. Peter Takayama and Mark R. Mullins have argued that civil religion
is something that is centered on the Yasukuni Shrine. Yasukuni is a holdover from the wartime
era when it was used to house the souls of those who died in defense of the nation. The souls
were deified and held there as they continue to help aid the defense of Japan in the afterlife.
Yasukuni is a private religious shrine that is not owned or operated by the government, however,
there have been and still are times when members of the government will make official visits to
the shrine and perform a religious ritual. The nature of the souls enshrined at Yasukuni makes
these actions more noteworthy than other examples of civil religion. From the late nineteenth
century through World War II, Japan invaded many different countries in Asia. This history has
remained a point of contention between Japan and other modern Asia nations, most prominently
China and Korea, as Japan has made few acknowledgements of the past war crimes and has
people who served in the war enshrined as sacred spirits. The Yasukuni shrine is the most
contentious shrine between China, Korea, and Japan as there are fourteen class-A war criminals
who are enshrined there as country-protecting deities. The visits to the Yasukuni shrine and the
gifts that are given to the shrine by the prime ministers of Japan cause a lot of controversy
between the countries and can make international news. The issue of the Yasukuni shrine
appears in newspapers in countries outside of Asia. This international focus on the Yasukuni
shrine makes it hard to act as a center for civil religion because civil religion, in a nation where
there is a strict separation between the government and religion, needs to be covert; attention
would ruin the ruse of separation.
Robert Bellah, in his article, “Civil Religion in America,” claims that in his speech,
Kennedy vaguely refers to God as the source from which all rights of people come from in the
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United States and the vagueness allows nearly all Americans to identify with the speech. 45 Civil
religion is something that exists as something vague for all people in the nation to gather behind.
This is not the case for the Yasukuni Shrine as there is so much attention from the international
community and from the politicians who either wish for it to be made into a state institution or
want remove the class-A war criminals. It is too divisive to serve as a proper center that quietly
unifies people. This does not mean that the people at the Yasukuni shrine have not tried to unify
everyone together through rhetoric of the Yasukuni Shrine. There is a guide for children when
they are visiting the shrine in order to answer any questions that the children might have about
the shrine. It is narrated by Poppo the pigeon and ends by telling the children that they must now
“treasure ‘Our Japan,’ which these people protected.” 46 The people who protected Japan are
people who fought in various wars and are now worshiped at the shrine. A cute pigeon tells
children that they should honor these souls because they are Japanese and it is their duty to honor
those who died for Japan. It is a way for the people to begin to see the Yasukuni Shrine as
something that is deeply important to Japan and Japanese identity because the people who are
enshrined there fought for the nation in order to keep it protected and free, which is only partially
true.
Yasukuni Shrine was originally built during the Meiji era as a shrine to honor “men who
sacrificed themselves in civil conflicts on the emperor’s behalf.” 47 It was a site that was
intimately tied to the symbol of the emperor and to the military. Yasukuni had a deep connection
to the various wars that Japan participated in because those who were killed in war would be
enshrined there. Since the shrine had been a place to honor and enshrine all who had fallen in
defense of Japan, most Japanese did not consider the shrine a religious site and neither did
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General MacArthur after his discussions with Catholic priests, Bruno Bitter and Patrick Byrne. It
was considered a civic institution where people could worship freely without breaking the codes
of their own religions. 48 Yasukuni prospered during all of the wars and had strong funding from
the government. During the 1930s and 1940s, Yasukuni started to become more militarized
because of World War II and other conflicts that Japan was involved in to expand the empire. 49
The occupation forces declared that Yasukuni shrine was a religious institution and that the
government needed to stop funding it in order to comply with the separation of the state and
religion along with the delegitimization of State Shinto after the war. 50 The shrine continued to
hold the spirits of war dead, but it did not enshrine the fourteen class-A war criminals that it is
infamous for housing today. The head priest did not want to risk placing such high-level war
criminals in the shrine and thus declined the requests from the Ministry of Health. It was not
until a new high priest came into office in 1978 that Yasukuni allowed the class-A war criminals
to be enshrined there as deities. 51 From this point onwards, the Yasukuni shrine would be firmly
situated in political debates primarily between China and Japan as to the justification of
enshrining these war criminals and about subsequent visits by prime ministers to the Yasukuni
shrine in their capacity as public officials.
The Yasukuni shrine has always been entangled with the state and religion, as it started
out as a shrine which supported the state and was part of the Meiji regime’s new State Shinto
policy after the Tokugawa era. Even after the occupation forces separated the state and religion
in the constitution after the war, Yasukuni still remained close to the government. Between 1969
and 1974, the Yasukuni Bill was brought before the Diet in order to nationalize the Yasukuni
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shrine six times. It failed each time, even with support from different right-wing groups such as
JAWBF and the Association of Shinto Shrines, because it breached the separation of the state
and religion. 52 After the enshrinement of the class-A war criminals, such a bill would be even
less likely to get passed into law because of the rift it would have caused between China and
Japan. Civil religion is something that acts covertly in a society such as postwar Japan. It cannot
be too overt as people can start to raise issues with contradictions if they attract too much public
attention. Yasukuni is at the center of international controversy between Japan and China and
Korea because of the war crimes of those who are enshrined there. The international controversy
extends beyond just Asia as it has made headlines in areas such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, where the issue has been portrayed in the New York Times and The Times,
respectively. 53 This is international attention that allows for many different vantage points and as
such Yasukuni cannot be a center of civil religion. In order for something to properly act as a
center of civil religion, there has to be a covert element to it, but since Yasukuni is at the heart of
such controversy it cannot act as an effective center.
During Prime Minister Koizumi’s tenure, he visited the shrine many times in an official
manner, which elicited harsh and increasing criticism from China, such that by late 2005 China’s
representatives were “refusing to meet with Koizumi on the sidelines of East Asian regional
meetings.” 54 From the perspective of the Chinese government and people, the visits that
Japanese prime ministers have performed as public officials seem to legitimize the shrine. The
prime minister going to the shrine also presents problems for the separation of the state and
religion in Japan because if the prime minister goes to the shrine and observes the customs in his
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or her position as a public official, then it seems as though the government is condoning the
enshrinement of the war criminals at Yasukuni. A way to get around the controversy would be to
remove the class-A war criminals from the shrine and place them elsewhere, which would, in the
eyes of some Japanese officials, make China and Korea accept the Yasukuni shrine more readily.
However, the problem with that is that the priests at the shrine argue that such a removal cannot
be done because the souls are bound to the shrine and beyond that, the government cannot just
remove the war criminals because doing so would violate the separation of the state and
religion. 55 There is no way to actually separate the shrine and the war criminals without the
shrine being made into a secular institution, which the LDP and the priests of the shrine do not
actually want because then it would ruin the entire point of the Yasukuni shrine, a place where
the spirits of the war dead can rest after serving the nation.
The Yasukuni shrine is also a focal point for political players, such as Japanese
nationalists, who want to see Japan as a country unto itself. There are Japanese ultranationalists
who believe that without a place to mourn their dead, Japan is not truly a “normal” country in the
sense that the United States is “normal” country. This belief is tied into the belief that Japan is
not a “normal” country since it cannot have a standing military as defined by the constitution. 56
The argument can seem compelling, but the two places are not actually equal in terms of
designated status, as Yasukuni is a private religious organization, while Arlington cemetery is
simply a cemetery where veterans and war dead are buried and is in fact owned by the military,
meaning it is not a private, religious institution. Another problem that arises with this vision of
the Yasukuni shrine is that the people who want to restore it to a place of national importance are
often associated with other nationalistic ideals for Japan. One such group is Japan Conference,
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Nippon Kaigi 日本会議, which has support from various high-ranking people in Japanese
society, such as business leaders, government officials, and officials from Shinto shrines. One
part of their mission is to support official visits to the Yasukuni shrine in addition to “patriotic
education” and constitutional revision. 57 The group is much more in line with the right-wing
nationalistic view of how Japan should be and a part of that vision seems to be the support of an
official state-centered morality. This action on their part seems to suggest that either that the
Japanese government has not fully devoted itself enough to an ideal morality for the people or
that there is no state-centered morality in Japan.
Politicians are also divided on the subject of the Yasukuni Shrine. More nationalistic
politicians favor support and official visits to Yasukuni, but those who are more liberal do not.
The focus by nationalist groups in Japan to get Yasukuni recognized as a state institution also
hampers the shrine’s ability to act as a proper center of civil religion because the discourse
surrounding the shrine is not covert enough. Yongwook Ryu produced a survey that asked about
feelings toward Yasukuni among members of the LDP and other political parties, which led him
to discover a bipartisan group of politicians who wanted to institute official visits to the
Yasukuni shrine. There is also a significant group of politicians in the LDP and other parties who
do not believe that official Yasukuni visits should be sanctioned. 58 This data complicates the
issue as the conservative LDP is not all of the same voice when it comes to the idea of official
Yasukuni visits and there are disagreements within the DPJ as well, meaning that there is an
unstable foundation for supporting the Yasukuni shrine as a bastion of civil religion. There are
also massive organizations within Japan that have opinions on this issue which has cause more
division and demonstrations in Japan. There have been demonstrations by labor unions and other
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non-governmental organizations to the visits to the shrine. 59 Public division about the Yasukuni
Shrine keeps it in the public eye, thus undermining it as an effective bastion of civil religion
because civil religion needs to be covert.
This might be a too overt for civil religion in postwar Japan, but there is another way that
scholars have theorized civil religion in postwar Japan. Winston Davis has theorized that since
Japanese religion has become secular, so too has the civil religion, which has become
Nihonjinron, the theory of Japanese uniqueness. 60 This argument is similar to the one of
Yasukuni shrine being civil religion as they are both nationalist and have the idea of Japanese
exceptionalism associated with them. The difference is that Nihonjinron is less overt than
Yasukuni. There are things about Nihonjinron that do not qualify it as a civil religion however,
first of all in the fact that it is not is not unified, which Davis himself even states in his chapter. 61
The lack of unity on what actually constitutes the Japanese national character and conflicting
notions based largely on the author’s personal experience means that it cannot really be
quantified into a civil religion.
In addition, there is nothing religious in nature about Nihonjinron. In Davis’s argument,
he brings up the fact that Nihonjinron has some of the same uses that civil religion had during the
war, but there is nothing religious about Nihonjinron, it is more of a genre of literature rather
than a religion used to create social cohesion. Another thing about Nihonjinron is that many
Japanese people, when polled, do not subscribe to the main core beliefs of Nihonjinron, usually
being fewer than fifty percent. And while Befu mentions that even though this does fail Davis’s
own criteria for civil religion, it still works because it is the most agreed upon ideology. 62 This
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really does not mitigate the fact that it does not cover a majority of the population. If Nihonjinron
needs majority support in order to be considered civil religion, then scholars should adhere to
that metric rather than adjust the criterion to fit the theory.
Neither the Yasukuni shrine nor Nihonjinron fit the Rousseauean definition of civil
religion in postwar Japan. There is too much controversy around the Yasukuni shrine for it to be
a proper center of civil religion. There is the international level of scrutiny that is placed on the
shrine between China, Korea, and Japan, which makes headlines around the world, including in
Europe and the United States. The central controversy concerns the enshrinement of class-A war
criminals from World War II and the visits that prime ministers have made in an official capacity.
Chinese and Korean officials view this as giving the shrine and enshrinements legitimacy, and
because they are such important diplomatic and trade partners with Japan, there is a split within
the government between politicians who support prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni and those
who do not. There have been demonstrations and court cases by different groups in Japan over
the visits that are made to the Yasukuni shrine. With all the attention that is devoted to Yasukuni,
it cannot act as a focal point for civil religion because civil religion needs to be covert. Civil
religion needs to be understood as not breaking the separation of the state and religion and it has
to be uniting for the people, rather than divisive.
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Section 3: Festivals
Separate from the legalistic side of civil religion, which follows more along the lines of
Rousseau’s argument regarding a state-guided morality, there is another type of civil religion that
Emile Durkheim described as society needing a religion of shared beliefs and rituals in order to
maintain itself. Durkheimian civil religion keeps society together by having regular communal
rituals that give participants a sense of unity. Some scholars claim that this type of civil religion
exists in postwar Japan instead of the Rousseauean type of civil religion. Durkheimian civil
religion is a different type of civil religion than has been previously discussed in this paper.
Rather than imposing religious unity on the country from the government, it is the union of a
people through religious identity. The people of the society have a collective belief and identity
that is affirmed through ceremonial actions that unite them as a people. 63 It is through these
collective beliefs and actions that a society is held together and maintained. This form of civil
religion requires participation in these social rituals and an ideal toward which society can
work. 64
The primary proponent of a Durkheimian notion of civil religion is Ian Reader, who
argues that civil religion in Japan is the local matsuri and pilgrimages that are performed to unite
the people under the ideal of the furusato, one’s own village, to create a spiritual homeland in the
modern world. 65 Putting on festivals and going on pilgrimages unite people as Japanese through
practice rather than belief, which is why Reader labels them “civil religion” rather than “religion.”
The problem with this view is that it assumes that practice without belief is not religious, which
does not fit in the Japanese context. The term “religion” was introduced to Japan at the very end
of the Tokugawa era and the beginning of the Meiji era. People in Japan debated how to translate
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“religion” into Japanese because there was no comparable existing term that combined belief and
practice. Belief became the dominant component of “religion” because by the nineteenth century
the English term “religion” was based primarily on understandings of Protestant Christianity. 66
Religious action in Japan is therefore understood as not religion because of the way that religion
was defined early on. Toshimao Ama gives an explanation how action, rather than just belief,
became more important as the way to salvation in the world throughout the Tokugawa period
and beyond. 67 Festivals and pilgrimages can be thought of as religious actions because even if
there is no belief in the people performing in the festivals and making pilgrimages, the action is
the important part. Further, there is the problem with ascertaining a person’s belief. Answers can
change based on time the time that the question is asked, say during a matsuri, and can change
based on who is asking about the person’s belief. It is difficult to rely on this metric fully.
Winston Davis also claims that Durkheimian civil religion exists in postwar Japan, but he
argues that civil religion has arisen as Japan has secularized due to the growth of the money
economy. 68 However, Davis’s view of the secularization of Japanese religion does not hold up
because the use of money does not mean that acts are not religious. Funerals and other memorial
services have been practiced in Japan for a long time and money has been taken by the priests,
but it has not made the acts any less religious. Davis also argues that belief has fallen in Japan
because of the use of money in religious practice. According to Davis, “Most shrines and
temples are more concerned about assisting members to fulfill their religious obligations to kith
and kin than they are with developing with an articulate worldview.” 69 This argument seems to
privilege belief over practice in the vein of the religious landscape of the West and does not
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properly place Japanese religious practices in their proper context. This argument about religion
also imagines a special “pure” form of religion that is separate the economic sphere of society.
There are two case studies that will show that Davis’s and Reader’s arguments do not
hold up. In Reader’s argument, there seems to be a focus on the shared religion of the people as
being a form of civil religion. 70 However, the special designation of civil religion rather than
“religion” seems useless. Reader focuses on the local matsuri as a way to explain why the people
who share this religious practice are engaging in civil religion. The reasoning seems to be that
since Japanese people share this practice that is not necessarily defined as either Shinto or
Buddhist it is therefore civil religion. Reader does not designate them as “religion” because
people from all religions can participate in these festivals without believing in them, but that
privileges belief over practice and keeps to a Western-centric view of religiosity. Davis, on the
other hand, takes a separate approach and does not consider practice in conjunction with the use
of money as a part of the religion and is instead a sign of the secularization of Japan. 71 Davis
seems to present the view that religion is not something that money can be involved with or else
the religion is has become corrupted by the “secular” world. This can be shattered by looking at
the various memorial services that have been practiced in Japan for a very long time in which
priests take money from the mourning family to perform the rites that support the temple. The
use of money does not make the ritual any less religious and yet Davis considers it decay in
belief because people are not going to temples in order to fulfill spiritual growth and just focus
on the obligation to the deceased family. The designation of civil religion is a way for the
scholars to sidestep the question of what “religion” itself means in Japan. Reader takes the local
matsuri to be civil religion because not all of the people necessarily believe in the meaning
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“behind” the action. Davis argues that the secularization of Japan has led from State Shinto
determining Japanese national identity to Nihonjinron as a secular civil religion without giving
proper consideration to the construction of the “secular” and “religious,” and taking the use of
money to signify the secular.
Matsuri most commonly refer to the Shinto shrine festivals that are practiced in various
different towns and cities around Japan. There are different types of festivals ranging from ones
at the local level to ones on the national level. 72 Since there is such variety of matsuri, there are
many different ones that can be applied to test Reader’s argument about matsuri being civil
religion. Furukawa is a small rural town in the Hida region, part of the northern Gifu prefecture
in Japan. It remained mostly isolated until the trains connected it to the rest of Japan in the
1930s. 73 Furukawa matsuri is a festival that is practiced in the spring when warmer weather has
come to the area and the cherry blossoms are just blooming in the village and is where the local
kami is believed to come into the village and the people petition them for the good harvests for
the year. However, the social aspect of gathering all the people together for one large effort has
become more important in the contemporary period. 74 While Schnell does note that there is a
difference in the social gathering aspect of the contemporary Furukawa matsuri, it is not
something that is actually mutually exclusive, since large harvests do require a large community
effort.
The matsuri in the contemporary period begins at 10:00 am with the gathering of Shinto
priests, parish elders, miko, shrine maidens, gagaku musicians, and low-ranking shrine officers
file into the main shrine hall. Once in the hall, the head priest waves a branch over the group who
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is bowing down with eyes forward. 75 Something important that Schnell mentions in his analysis
of the matsuri is that the kami is treated as an honored guest as the offerings are presented before
the altar on a table. 76 This is the offering part of the matsuri and is not actually a part of the
larger fanfare; it is very ritualistic and measured. At 1:00 pm, people gather outside of the shrine
in order to escort the mikoshi 神輿, portable shrine, on its way around the town. But before the
mikoshi can be taken around the town, the head priest has to take the kami from the main shrine
to it in an amulet wrapped in cloth while he is wearing white gloves and a white mask. The
musicians around will play their instruments more loudly in order to build drama for the transfer
as the head priest places the talisman in the mikoshi. 77 The mikoshi is then paraded around town
in a set path with abbreviated rituals of the shrine ritual being performed and it eventually settles
at the building called the o-tabisho 御旅所 for the rest of the festival. 78 This is the more formal
part of the event, as the rest of the event is filled with more revelry as the night comes about.
This part of the matsuri is known as the tsuke daiko 付け太鼓, rousing drum ceremony, and it is
when a drum is played and paraded around town starting at 10:00 pm. 79 Overall, the festival is
very exciting with a lot of lively behavior and many people throughout the town participating in
the procession. This excitement has led to it being a very famous matsuri for people to visit from
around Japan.
The importance of the community in creating the large event cannot be understated as it
really has become a focus of the Furukawa matsuri in the postwar era. This type of event is what
Ian Reader would label as civil religion in his argument about the practice of matsuri unifying
people through the furusato ideal. The event has been a way for the town of Furukawa to attract
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tourists by attempting to create a sense of nostalgia in the communal village ceremony of the
past. 80 While it may seem like there could be a distinction between “religion” and “civil religion”
in this matsuri, like Reader has claimed in his article, that is not the case. The practice of the
matsuri and its attraction for tourists are rooted in religion. The event hearkens back to the
imaginary of a more community-oriented Japan rather than the consumerist society that has
become so prominent in the contemporary period. This has been played up by the community in
order to attract tourists and build the economy in the very rural town. As such they have built a
museum with certain pieces of the festival along with a movie of the rousing drum ceremony so
that more people would attend the town more often than just the matsuri. 81 Reader argues that
this is what defines these festivals as civil religion because the Japanese people are searching to
recreate an idealized past within modern society. 82 I argue that the special designation of civil
religion complicates the matsuri because religious practice, even with money and tourism
surrounding it, is still religious practice.
Davis argues that the secularization of religion in Japan set up the environment in which
a new civil religion could come about. His argument is that the money economy started this
secularization process. He argues that as money became more present, the groups that were in
charge of festivals and rituals became less cohesive and also time that was spent for religious
ritual shrank as people needed to spend more time in work to get money. Also the modernizing
influence of a standard time and calendar that slowly ended the applicability of local customs
based on the lunar calendar. 83 In response to this, one need only look at the practice of funeral
Buddhism in the Tokugawa era. Priests charged money for memorial services which would aid
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the deceased family member in their movement in the afterlife. Particularly important was the
ordination of the dead as a Buddhist monk and getting a Buddhist lineage chart with their dharma
name. 84 The family spent money in order to have their relative taken care of in this way and it
would lead them to a better rebirth. This was a religious ceremony and people spent money on it
in order to help their family members move throughout the next life and into a better one. Part of
the reason that this became so prominent was the fact that the Tokugawa government enforced a
registration system in which all families must be aligned with a certain Buddhist temple in order
to be proved not Christian. The temples had a lot of power in the way they could keep outcasts in
line by giving them bad posthumous names and only those with a lot of money could buy their
way out of it. 85 This was a way that temples could keep people in their parishes following the
order of Tokugawa society.
The temples also had a lot of power in the way that they sold medicine during the
Tokugawa era. One such medicine was a herbal pill called Gedokuen which was sold through the
Soto Zen sect of Buddhism because, according to legend, it was given to Dogen, the founder of
Soto Zen in Japan, by the kami, Inari and was supposed to be passed down his dharma lineage. 86
This was a way to connect the medicine of divine origin and made it special. Not only was
associated with Buddhism through Dogen, but also to Shinto through Inari. This medicine was
also bound up in the economy because of the great demand and it was distributed through the
Soto Zen temples. Beyond just this example of money being used, Davis’s assertion assumes that
the use of money leads to the secularization of religion, which is based on a modern, Protestantcentric notion that religion should be separate from the economic and political spheres. Further,
it implies that religion would just become secularized in every society that had a money
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economy and while religion does change, it does not just become secular. And this belief of the
secularity does not fit in with premodern or non-Western societies as well because it is just as
much of a construct as religion. Without religion, as understood in a modern, Western context,
secularity cannot exist as secularity is described as the lack of religion.
All in all, the designation of Durkheimian civil religion in postwar Japan does not hold up.
Reader’s argument that there is civil religion in the way that people seek an idealized past
through the practice of matsuri does not take into proper consideration the importance of practice
instead of just belief. He seems to argue that matsuri are civil religion because they are practiced
in order to fulfill an obligation to the community and bind the community together through
tradition rather than centering on belief in the deity that the matsuri is honoring. However,
religion in the context of Japan has been defined by actions, and not necessarily belief. Davis’s
argument about the secularization of Japanese religion leading to a new civil religion does not
hold up because money does not just lead to the secularization of religion. In addition, there were
religious practices that have been performed with the exchange of money in the Tokugawa era.
Durkheimian civil religion does not fit with postwar Japan because it unnecessarily complicates
Japanese religion. The use of “civil religion” by scholars is a way to explain away religious
activity that is too economic and thus secularized, or purely ritual actions. There is still a
Protestant-centric understanding of religion which keeps scholars from fully being able to study
religion in a comparative sense because religions other than Protestant Christianity do not fit the
same mold.
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Conclusion
In 1996 Ama Toshimaro published Why Are the Japanese Non-Religious? (Jpn.: Nihonjin
wa naze mushūkyō nano ka? 日本人はなぜ無宗教なのか), which quickly became a bestseller.
The book deals with the seemingly conflicting way that Japanese people claim to be not religious
but also engage in different religious activities. 87 The book presents a paradoxical notion in that
people in Japan are non-religious and yet still engage in religious activity. Many scholars have
accepted the concept of Japanese non-religiosity, which has led to certain maneuvers in
analyzing Japanese people’s participation in religious activity. One of these maneuvers has been
to describe such activities as civil religion.
Civil religion is a concept that was created to imagine a society running perfectly.
Rousseau argued that there might be a religion of the state that brings unity to the people but
does not call them to be loyal to any other institution or look out for a better afterlife. 88 Another
view is that civil religion can take the form of a group of people practicing a religion they may
not believe in, but is done in order to promote community and follows more along the lines of
Durkheim’s idea of religion and society’s intermingling. Robert Bellah’s “Civil Religion in
America” brought civil religion into the modern context, where it was eventually applied to
Japan in both the pre- and post-World War II eras. Various scholars have argued that civil
religion is a proper designation for postwar Japan, but I argue that religion, rather than civil
religion, works as a better term overall.
Religion is a term that was originally coined in the West and translators in Japan had a
difficult time making sense of the term because there was no term like in Japan before that time.
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Since the translation was based mostly on the idea of belief following Protestant Christianity,
that is the primary metric for religion with the new term shūkyō in Japan. 89 This has led to a
belief that people in contemporary Japan are non-religious because polls show that the people do
not subscribe to a certain religion, but they do practice religious rituals and generally believe that
these rituals are important. 90 Since the basis of religion that most people in the West have rests
on belief, it is important to understand the differences that exist in other places regarding religion.
Religion can be actions that people perform rather than the beliefs that people have, so that the
term “religion” can fit different cultural contexts that did not develop with a concept of beliefcentered religion. In the case of Japan, there is a history of ritual practice to gain benefits in both
this world and the afterlife rather than just active belief. 91 This helps to inform the notion that
Japan is a non-religious country.
There are three different areas that I look at to see the possibility of civil religion being an
adequate designation for postwar Japan. The court cases are a context to observe and understand
civil religion by seeing if the courts uphold the support of religion by the government. Yasukuni
shrine is another context to see if civil religion is a proper description of Japan because of
Yasukuni’s past as part of State Shinto and prime ministers’ annual visits to the shrine. Festivals
have also been brought up as a way to describe Japanese civil religion because of the way that
the people participate in them in order to create community rather than actually believing in the
actions that they are performing. They go through the motions because it is expected. These are
all ways that scholars have argued that civil religion exists in postwar Japan, but I have argued
that this is not the case.
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Court cases are more an example of Rousseauean civil religion in that the various court
cases deal with how the government supports religion specifically. In the case of the courts,
religious ritual had been upheld as a viable use of public funds in different Supreme Court
decisions in Japan starting with the Tsu City Grounbreaking Ceremony Case. 92 The case set the
standard of looking at all future cases where the government and the religion intermingled too
closely. And while the Supreme Court favored the government in the majority of these hearings,
the local and district courts did not. In later cases, like the Nakaya Enshrinement case, there have
even been splits of opinions on the Supreme Court regarding the separation of the state and
religion. 93 The government has shown that there is not enough agreement on the case of the
nature of the separation of the state and religion to viably call the use of religious ritual civil
religion because there is not a solid position that can be held about it.
The Yasukuni shrine is another site that scholars like K. Peter Takayama use as an
example of civil religion. Yasukuni shrine is a place where souls of the war dead were enshrined
after giving their lives for the empire and has a history that is deeply ingrained in the Japanese
imperial domination of Asia. Part of that history is the enshrinement of fourteen class-A war
criminals in Yasukuni and annual visits and shrine offerings from various prime ministers such
as Prime Minister Koizumi, which has elicited harsh criticism from China and Korea. 94 While
there are those, like K. Peter Takayama, who have argued that this is a sign of growing interest in
the revitalization of an old State Shinto style civil religion in Japan, I argue that such a thing
cannot be possible in the context of the Yasukuni shrine. 95 Yasukuni is a place that has a lot of
attention focused on it because of the controversial nature of the war criminals enshrined there
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and civil religion needs to be more covert in order to act as a proper bastion of social unity. If the
Japanese government were to put its full support behind Yasukuni, it would not only be an issue
between China and Korea and Japan, it would also make headlines around the world meaning
something like the revitalization of civil religion through Yasukuni could not be possible.
Moreover, the shrine is a religious institution rather than just a governmental or secular space;
the visits to the shrine by the prime ministers could just be described as religious acts rather than
civil religious acts.
“Religious” is also a good way to describe the actions of people who participate in local
matsuri in Japan. Ian Reader has argued that there are those who do not necessarily believe in
these actions and merely use them to fulfill and obligation to the community rather than a
personal religious act. 96 This is more of an example of Durkheimian civil religion as the
argument focuses on the creation of community through religious practices, thus making it civil
religion. I argue that Reader is focusing too much on the belief aspect of the religion and not
enough on the action of the religion, which is arguably more important in a Japanese context
which did not have the concept of religion until it was introduced in the Meiji era. 97 The
argument for civil religion does not make much sense when religion works perfectly fine to
describe the matsuri as they are performed in different villages. The notion of civil religion
complicates the description and understanding of religion in Japan, focusing on belief without
giving proper examination to the action of religion.
In the larger scale of the discussion of religion in Japan, issues arise when identifying
postwar Japan, especially Shinto actions and areas, as specifically civil religion. Shinto is
oftentimes discussed and thought of by a majority of people as something unique to Japan that
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had either an unbroken continuous worship throughout Japanese history or served as an
underlying mood of the Japanese people, even if it is not practiced. 98 By focusing on Shinto as
something unique to Japan and removing its religious nature, as some scholars have done, the
comparative study of Shinto cannot be done because there is nothing else to which to compare it.
By looking at Shinto and Shinto practices as civil religion there is too much focus on how these
actions are civil religion rather than just religion. Another important thing to consider when
looking at civil religion is the stress of a Protestant mode of comparative study of religion.
Rather than focusing on religion as action and practice, all the focus is on the belief aspect of
religion, and while that is an important part to the study of religion, it is just that, a part. As Asad
has argued there needs to be an unpacking of the definition that scholars have of religion before
looking at religion to make sure that the study is not marred by the understanding of religion
from one particular historical perspective. 99 If there is to be significant comparative study of
religion, then religion as defined in the more Protestant belief-centric model of religion needs to
be discarded and religion needs to be approached in a more holistic manner. Civil religion in
postwar Japan complicates the study of religion and does not make sense in the context. It is
more apt to look at religion to better study and understand.
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